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Liquefied natural gas is a fast growing source of clean energy in the U.S. This industry 
has been keeping an excellent safety record in the manufacturing, handling, 
transportation and distribution sectors. Even with the safety record, there have been a 
number of catastrophic incidents in the past as well as some incidents that did not lead to 
significant damage.   
There have been a lot of studies on safety and risk management on LNG facilities and 
LNG marine transportation. But very few studies have been done on risk management of 
LNG road transportation. LNG is transported by road in certain areas in U.S. and safety 
assessments should be performed to ensure its safe transportation. This study 
investigates the hazards and risks associated with LNG transportation by focusing on 
road transportation. It analyses road transport incident history and identifies different 
scenarios leading to LNG road transport incidents. Hazard Identification was performed 
to list the hazards and their impact. The measures for reducing their risk are then 
evaluated qualitatively. For a complete overview of incident scenarios, a bow-tie 
analysis was performed. For the prevention and mitigation of LNG incident initiated by 
spill, a set of safety barriers are proposed. In the analysis it was found that, among the 
safety barriers a number of them lack proper standard and guidance. The barriers 
maintenance and inspection, traffic rule enforcement, road condition improvement, 




adequate guidance and therefore recommendations were provided for improving them. 
Based on the identification and assessment of incident scenarios and study of existing 
codes and standards, recommendations on risk management strategy are provided. In the 
assessment of scenarios in PHAST software, effects of thermal radiation and vapor 
concentrations of LNG were compared with the safety distances provided in different 
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Natural gas is becoming significant as clean source of energy in United States. It 
is used in homes for heating and cooking, and by public institutions and industries for 
direct use or to generate electric power and as a fuel in natural gas powered vehicles. 
According to Annual Energy Outlook 2014 with projections from 2012 to 2040 
published by U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. total natural gas 
consumption will raise from 25.6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2012 to 31.6 Tcf in 2040 [1]. 
Figure 1 shows U.S. natural gas consumption by sector projecting from 2012 to 2040. 
Although transportation sector accounts for a small percentage of total U.S. natural gas 
consumption according to the figure, natural gas use by heavy duty vehicles, trains and 
ships shows the largest percentage growth of any fuel in the projection [1].  
 
 




Natural gas is liquefied to produce LNG (Liquefied natural gas) so that it can be 
easily and economically stored and transported. It is then transported from liquefaction 
facilities to receiving terminals and regasification facilities [2]. The LNG value chain is 
shown in figure 2. Although most of the LNG is transported by waterway, a significant 
amount of it is transported by tanker trucks on roadways which transport LNG from the 
receiving terminal to vehicle refueling stations. 
 
 
Figure 2: LNG value chain 
 
For over four decades LNG has been transported and consumed worldwide and 
has been keeping an excellent safety record [3]. The reasons for this record are technical 
and operational evolvement, incorporation of the knowledge of risk and hazards 
associated with LNG into operations and strong application of standards and regulations 
to the LNG industry.  
 

















The demand for LNG is growing fast and it is expected to be more than double to 
approximately 480 million tons annually (MTA) over the next 20 years [2]. Several 
reasons for this future expectation are need for cleaner energy, abundant supply and 
relatively low price of LNG. 
Although there were few major accidents associated with LNG, a lot of minor 
incidents and near misses also took place in LNG industry and transportation. A major 
portion of LNG is transported through waterways whereas a small percentage is 
transported by LNG truck tankers on roads. These truck tankers usually carry around 
12,000 to 13,000 gallons of LNG [4]. Transportation of this large volume of LNG via 
highways and public roads raises many safety concerns. Also there are many LNG 
powered vehicles that also carry a significant amount of LNG and pose risks during 
transportation. With the forecasted increase in transportation of LNG and its use as a fuel 
could increase the probability of incidents. Therefore it is important to identify and 
assess the risks and hazards associated with LNG road transportation, and subsequent 
preventative and mitigative measures should be well organized and well-practiced. 
This research looks to identify hazards and risks associated with road 
transportation of LNG by analyzing road transport incident history and identifying 
different scenarios leading to those incidents. For the prevention and mitigation of LNG 
incident resulting in a spill, a set of safety barriers will be proposed. Suggestion for risk 






1.2 LNG Properties 
Natural gas is liquefied at -162 °C (-260 °F) under atmospheric pressure and this 
procedure reduces its volume by approximately 600 times. LNG contains mainly 95% 
methane and some other hydrocarbons such as ethane, propane, isobutene and may also 
contain small amounts of sulfur dioxide or carbon dioxide. LNG is non-toxic, odorless 
colorless, non-corrosive and weighs about 45% of water weight. Table 1 provides some 
important properties of LNG. 
 
Table 1: Properties and flammability limits of LNG [3] 
Flash point -1880C 
Boiling Point -1600C 
Lower flammability limit 15% 
Upper flammability limit 5% 
Auto-ignition temperature 5400C 
Stored pressure Atmospheric 
Vapor density at boiling point 1.82kg/m3 
 
LNG has a narrow flammability range (5%-15%) and has a very high auto-ignition 
temperature which makes LNG less likely to be ignited [3]. Moreover, storing in 
atmospheric pressure makes it flow and evaporate in case of a leak in the storage and 
there will be no immediate ignition. In a situation of an open LNG spill, it can burn only 




LNG is its cryogenic property. If LNG is released, direct contact with it can cause 
cryogenic burn. 
1.3 Road Transportation of LNG 
In the U.S. a number of companies operate LNG tanker trucks- Southeast LNG, LP 
Transportation, Tri-Mac, KAG.inc, Transgas, Clean Energy, J.B.Kelley [4]. LNG 
transportation system uses almost similar technology that is used to transport the other 








Figure 3: LNG tanker truck (http://www.thekag.com/) 
 
Typical LNG tanker trucks are double-shelled insulated container. The approximate 
height of the trucks is 12’6” and lengths are 40 to 45 feet [5]. The sizes and lengths vary 
by manufacturers. The outer tank is made of carbon steel or stainless steel and the inner 
tank is usually made of stainless steel or high strength aluminum. The annular space 
between the two tanks contains insulating material such as perlite, fiberglass and foil 




prevents heat transfer to the tank from the surrounding environment. This structural 
design and insulation system make the tank sturdy enough to act against impact, physical 
damage and fire. 
For assessing safety of road transportation of LNG by tanker truck, identification of 
hazards and safeguards are necessary. The risks associated with LNG road transportation 
are high impact crashes or mechanical failure which might lead to injuries and property 
damage.  
1.4 Objectives 
 The purpose of this study is to identify hazards and risks associated with 
transportation of LNG by truck tanker and provide suggestions on a risk management 
strategy for LNG road transportation. The objectives of this research are stated below: 
 To perform a historical analysis based on the incident data for LNG road 
transportation 
 To perform HAZID to find a list of hazards and evaluate the significance of the 
hazards and risk reducing measures qualitatively 
 To perform a bow-tie analysis for a complete overview of major risks associated 
with LNG tanker truck transportation and to propose safety barriers to prevent 
and mitigate LNG spill from incidents. 
 Identification and assessment of scenarios leading to LNG incidents  
 To propose recommendation on risk management strategy for LNG road 








2.1 Qualitative Risk Analysis for LNG Road Transportation 
Risk management of LNG road transportation requires identification and 
evaluation of threats to potential hazardous events and analysis of the consequences and 
their severity. In this study a hazard identification technique, hazard review will be used 
to find and understand the significance of hazards associated with LNG road 
transportation. Then a bow-tie analysis will be performed to clearly visualize how a 
major hazardous event, LNG spill can occur and what safeguards can be used to prevent 
and mitigate them. The event tree in the bow-tie diagram provides list of threats to an 
LNG tanker truck leading to an LNG spill. For the prevention of LNG spill, a list of 
safety barriers will be provided by evaluating safeguards and safety gaps in existing 
standards and guidelines. Same methodology will be followed to identify mitigative 
safety barriers for the fault tree part in the bow-tie diagram where hazardous 
consequences from LNG spill would be listed. 
 
 
Figure 4: Methodology 
Hazard 
Identification 












2.2 Hazard Identification 
Anything that has potential to cause harm to people, property and environment is 
defined as hazard [6]. A hazard can be a material, an activity or a situation. The process 
of identifying hazards is called Hazard identification (HAZID) [6]. This technique can 
be used to get a list of all hazards for their evaluation using risk assessment techniques 
and it is known as “failure case selection” [6]. HAZID can also be used to perform 
qualitative evaluation of the significance of hazards and risk reducing measures which is 
known as “Hazard Assessment” and will be used in this study [6]. 
There are many HAZID techniques available such as Hazard and Operability studies 
(HAZOP), What-if Checklist, Hazard review, Hazard Review, Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and so 
on. Among them hazard review technique will be used in this study to perform 
qualitative review of LNG road transportation for the identification of hazards and 
understand their significance. This method uses experience from different sources and is 
suitable for concept design. For the hazard review, the following concern will be 
addressed: 
 Previous Safety Assessments  
 Survey of previous accidents 
 Previous experience 
 Guidelines and code of practice 




After identifying the hazards and their significance, a Bow-tie analysis will be 
performed to get a visual summary of incident scenarios and to propose a set of safety 
barriers.  
2.3 Bow-tie Analysis 
A bow-tie analysis is a structured approach for risk analysis. This analysis links 
potential threats and consequences in a single diagram [6]. The left side of a bow-tie is a 
simplified fault tree and the right side is a simplified event tree. For the better readability 
of the analysis the probabilities are not considered because the main function of a bow-
tie diagram is to provide clear picture of mechanisms and to allow associated people to 
understand how a hazardous event can occur and what safeguards are available to 
prevent and mitigate them [6]. Therefore, the focus of the bow-tie analysis is on 
analyzing and proposing safety barriers and then incorporating them in the diagram. In 
this study, a set of safety barriers will be proposed for the prevention and mitigation of 
LNG spill from a truck tanker.  
 
 




2.4 Safety Barriers  
Sklet, S. defines safety barrier as physical and/or non-physical means planned to 
prevent, control or mitigate undesired events or accidents [7]. ISO: 13702(Requirements 
and guidelines for control and mitigation of fires and explosions on offshore production 
installations) defines prevention as means to reduce the likelihood of a hazardous event, 
control as means to limit the extent and/or duration of a hazardous event to prevent 
escalation and mitigation as means to reduce the effects of a hazardous event [8].  
Before proposing safety barriers, barrier functions should be properly defined. 
Sklet, S. defines a barrier function as a function planned to prevent, control or mitigate 
undesired events or accidents [7]. In the bow-tie analysis for incidents in LNG 
transportation, two barrier functions were introduced-prevention and mitigation. In 
developing the barriers, a number of issues have been considered that are listed in table 
2. 
 
Table 2: Considerations to identify the safety barriers 
 
 
The barrier system was classified according to the barrier functions, based on the 
classification system recommended by Sklet, S. [7]. As shown in figure 6, barrier system 
Preventative barriers Mitigative barriers 
Prevent the hazard from being released Minimize the effect 
Keeping control Limit the severity of the event 




can be classified as passive and active barrier system. This classification was also 
proposed by CCPS and Kjellen [9][10].  According to CCPS passive protection layer 
does not need to take an action for achieving its function to reduce risk and an active 
protection layer is required to be moved to different states in response to a significant 
change in a process condition [9]. Kjellen describes passive barriers as fixed in the 
design and active barriers as dependant on actions to function as intended [10]. 
 
 
Figure 6: Classification of safety barrier system [7] 
 
Passive barrier systems often are combination of physical and human/operational 
elements whereas active barrier system comprises of technical and human/operational 
elements. Sklet, S. adopted the 4th level classification in figure 5 from Hale [11] and 




After classifying the safety barriers for LNG road transportation according to 
Sklet, S., the barriers will be evaluated based on current regulations and standards. Then 


























3.1 Hazard Review 
Hazard review is a qualitative review of a system to identify hazards and to gain 
qualitative understanding for their significance [6]. For the hazard review, the following 
issues were addressed: previous safety assessment, survey of previous accidents, 
previous experience, guidelines and codes of practice, and hazardous materials data. 
This section provides more details on each of the steps, as applied to the hazard 
identification of road transportation of LNG. 
3.1.1 Previous Safety Assessments 
In this assessment, a study of previous risk assessments was done to obtain an 
outline appreciation of hazards. In a study of characteristics and prevention of road 
transport LNG accidents, the causes of LNG transportation accidents were analyzed 
[13]. These causes are fatigue driving, overloading, hazardous characteristics of LNG, 
absence of rigorous accident prevention and emergency measures, long distance 
transport, and unreasonable road design.  
This study provided several recommendations to improve road transport 
condition for LNG such as requirements for vehicle type and safety, requirements of 
employees, requirements of roads and natural condition consideration. Figure 7 provides 





Figure 7: LNG transport accidents prevention, modified from [13] 
 
In an analysis of the explosion of an LNG tanker truck containing liquefied 
natural gas [14] an attempt was made to clarify how and why it occurred. A historical 
analysis was made based on the statistics of accidents involving hazardous materials 
(total 12,179 accidents) and explosion consequence modeling was done. According to 
the historical study, 8.6% of the accidents occurred during road transport and only 9 of 
them involved LNG [14]. The incident mentioned earlier happened because the tanker 
•Verification of qualification to transport dangerous
goods.
•Signing safety responsibility agreement to promote
enterprises to implement the main security
responsibility and relevant laws and regulations.
Improving relevant laws and 
regulations
•To enhance predictability ,possible scenarios should
be fully considered
•Carrying out coordination and joint exercises or
seminars
•Improvement and revision of the program by listening
to the opinions of units and experts
Making emergency programs
•Making a fixed line for inter-provincial long distance
LNG road transport
•Forbidding transport vehicles to go close to residential
area
Making reasonable routes
•Mandatory rest zones in the routes
•Inspection and repair of vehicles
•Insist on the principal of 'two drivers a vehicle'and no
continuous driving more than 6 hours




turned over due to speeding on a downhill section of the road. Several causes for the 
accident were detected such as release of truck fuel, leakage of LNG from the safety 
valve and truck structure distortion. 
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory published a report in 1998 for LNG 
vehicle refueling stations [15] which included qualitative assessment of worker and 
public risk associated with tanker truck deliveries and end use vehicle fueling. For this 
analysis, Master Logic Diagram, a FMEA (Failure mode and effect analysis) and 
historical operating experiences were used to identify accident initiating events. In their 
analysis a number of initiating events to LNG release was identified that are listed in the 
Master logic diagram in Figure 8 that they developed. Although these initiating events 






Figure 8: Master logic diagram: LNG release 
 
3.1.2 Survey of Previous Incidents 
In this study, a database has been developed with a collection of LNG tanker truck 
incidents. Although the process cannot be comprehensive, it will ensure previous 
accidents are not overlooked. The data in Appendix A was taken from the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration incident report database and other relevant 




companies in U.S. From the database, risks in road transportation were identified. 
Appendix A lists LNG road transportation incidents from 1971 to 2012. 
The data was collected to find out the possible causes of LNG road transport 
accidents and percentage contribution to LNG transportation accidents is shown in figure 
9. 23% of the accidents were caused by mechanical failure such as a loose or cracked 
valve. Rollover incidents were 26% of the total accidents. 26% percent accidents were 
caused by human error such as driver inattentiveness, speeding, drunk driving and 
ignoring traffic rules. Blowout (punctured tire) and other factors such as sliding down 























3.1.3 Previous Experience 
In this study near miss accidents and operating problems associated with LNG 
tanker trucks and other LNG vehicles have been assessed. Detailed report on the 
incidents [16] presented by the authorized persons of the companies were analyzed 
which provided a picture of the seriousness of the incidents. Most of the incidents found 
in history (Appendix A) are near miss incidents associated with LNG tanker trucks.  
Because of the hazardous properties of LNG, (i.e. cryogenic, flammable, asphyxiant), 
any transportation system is prone to incidents no matter how safe the system is. 
Although there have not been many serious incidents, lots of near misses were found in 
the analysis. The more we know about the leading causes of near misses, the lower the 
risk. So near misses should be accounted to prevent any future incidents. 
3.1.4 Hazardous Materials Data 
Analysis on hazards of LNG was done based on the Safety Datasheets found 
from different companies. Based on the composition of their LNG, the hazard ratings are 











Table 3: Chemical composition of LNG from different companies [18][19][20][21][22] 
Company Chemical composition Hazard Rating 
FortisBC Methane (95%), Ethane (3%), Propane (1%), 
Nitrogen (1%) 
NFPA Rating: Health 2 
Flammability 4 
stability 0 
NW Natural Methane (>93.5%), Ethane (3.8%), Propane (1%), 
i-butane (<0.1%), n-Butane (<0.1%), i-
Pentane(<0.1%), n-Pentane(<0.1%), n-
Hexane(<0.1%), Carbon Dioxide(0.3%), 
Nitrogen(1.2%), t-Butyl Mercaptan(<30 ppm), 
Methyl Ethyl Sulfide(<3 ppm), Hydrogen 
Sulfide(<5ppm) 
NFPA Rating: Health 3 
Flammability 4 
stability 0 
Linde Methane (62-93%), Ethane (3-11%), Nitrogen (1-
9%), Propane (1-7%), N-Butane (1-3%), Isobutane 
(1-3%), Helium (<2%), Isopentane (<1%), pentane 
(<1%), Carbon Dioxide (<1%) 
NFPA Rating: Health 3 
Flammability 4 
stability 0 
EP Energy Methane (60-95%), Ethane (1-60%), Propane (20-
60%), i-butane (0-4%), i-pentane (0-2%), i-
Hexane (0-2%), n-Butane (2-5%),  n-Pentane(5-
25%), n-Hexane(<2-13%), Carbon Dioxide(0-5%), 
Nitrogen(0-15%), Hydrogen Sulfide(varies) 
NFPA Rating: Health 2 
Flammability 4 
stability 0 
ConocoPhillips Methane (100%) NFPA rating: Health 3, 
Flammability 4, stability 0 
 





Common hazards of LNG are listed below: 
 Flammability 
 Pooling and brittle failure 
 Phase change and overpressure 
 -Vessel overpressure failure 
-Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) 
 -Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) 
 -Vapor Cloud Explosion  
 Cryogenic Burns 
 Environmental Effects 
3.1.5 Guidelines and Code of Practice 
There are several standards that LNG industry must comply with but there are not 
enough guidelines specifically for LNG road transportation.  
 LNG industry must comply with air and water standards established by U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency and state environmental agencies [23]. These 
standards were designed to protect public health and welfare from different types 
of pollutants by enforcing vehicles to use state-of-the-art emission control 
technologies and plants and facilities to use modern pollution control technology. 
 NFPA 59A-Standard for the Production, Storage and Handling of Liquefied 
Natural Gas was the first LNG standard released by the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA). It states some standards on training of all personnel 




and unloading facilities [24]. This standard states some tank vehicles not under 
the jurisdiction of DOT (U.S. Department of Transportation) shall comply with 
CGA341- the Standard for Insulated Cargo tank Specification for Cryogenic 
Liquid, and Flammable liquid tank vehicles shall comply with NFPA 385 ( the 
standard for tank vehicles for flammable and combustible liquids) [24]. 
 NFPA 57-Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Vehicular Fuel Systems Code applies to 
the design, installation, operation, and maintenance of LNG engine fuel systems 
on all types of vehicles. This standard is also applicable to their associated 
fueling (dispensing) facilities [25].  
 NFPA 52 provides standards to mitigate fire and explosion hazards associated 
with compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) engine fuel 
systems and fueling facilities [26]. 
 LNG tank trucks must comply with design standards provided by Department of 
Transportation, ASME and some others which are provided below in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Standards for LNG tank truck construction [27][28][29][30][31] 
Tank 
construction 
DOT CFR49 specifications– 49 CFR parts 173.318 and 178.338 
(MC-338) 
DOT-4L 
ASME Section 8 Div 1 
NFPA 52 
SAE J2343 





In some regions of the U.S., safety concerns regarding LNG manufacturing, 
handling, storing and transportation led to the implementation of laws and regulations. 
For example, in New York City there was a moratorium on the siting of LNG facilities 
and intrastate transportation routes which existed from 1973 to 1999 [4] 
The standards listed above provide a guideline for operating a safe LNG plant 
and road transport. They do not specify the hazards that each measure is intended to 
control. But it can be checked if road transportation of LNG tanker truck conforms to 
good engineering practice. 
3.2 Bow-tie Analysis 
The potential threats leading to LNG spill were detected from the hazard review 
technique that has been done and are listed in table 5.  
 
Table 5: Potential threats for LNG spill from truck tank 
Threats Reason  
Mechanical Failure Loose valve 
cracked valve 
piping failure 
Structural failure Brittle fracture 
Corrosion 





External fire Fire initiated by truck fuel 
Fire initiated by other source 
Rollover Operation problem 
Poor road condition 
Human error Driver fatigue 





The potential consequences of an LNG spill are listed on the right side of the 
bow-tie diagram. Figure 10 shows a simple version of the bow-tie diagram where the 
threats and consequences are listed. For the risk management a set of safety barriers are 




Figure 10: Bow-tie analysis for LNG spill from LNG tanker truck 
 
 According to the classification, the safety barriers required for the prevention 







Table 6: Safety barriers for prevention and mitigation of LNG spill from LNG tanker    
truck incident 
Barriers Characterization Prevention Mitigation 
Passive, physical -Functioning 
continuously 
-Might be temporary 
 Structural design 
 Material selection 
 Pressure and 
temperature design 
 Passive fire 
protection 
 Structural design 








-Implemented as part of 
high risk activity 
-Executed by human 
with the support of an 
organization 
 
 Training and 
competence 
 Improved road 
condition 
 Traffic rule 
enforcement 
 Certification of 
LNG truck tank 
 Driver proficiency 
 Training and 
competence 




 Active fire 
protection system 
 Maintenance and 
inspection 
 Un-ignited gas 
cloud mitigative 
control 







-Integrated part of work 














3.2.1 Preventative Safety Barriers 
Preventative barriers are provided to work before an initiating event takes place. 
They ensure that the accident does not happen or at least decelerate the development of 
the initiating event leading to an accident. As mentioned earlier, from the historical 
analysis of LNG tanker truck incidents a number of threats were identified that might 
lead to LNG spill and are listed in table 5. Based on the root causes of these threats, 
preventative barriers were proposed in different classes of the barrier system. Figure 11 
shows a representation of the classification of the preventative barriers and figure 12 
shows their placement in the bow-tie analysis. 
 
 
Figure 11: Classification of preventative safety barriers 
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Figure 12: Preventative barriers for LNG spill in the bow-tie analysis 
 
3.2.2 Mitigative Safety Barriers  
 Mitigative barriers work after specific initiating event has happened. They are 
supposed to protect people, environment and property from the consequences of the 
event [7]. After an LNG spill has taken place, there are a number of consequences that 
can occur such as fire, pooling and brittle failure, vessel overpressure failure, BLEVE, 
vapor cloud explosion. Rapid phase transition is one of the consequences that can 
happen in the presence of water but for a scenario in road, it can be eliminated. Figure 13 
shows a representation of the classification of the mitigative barriers and figure 14 shows 





Figure 13: Classification of mitigative safety barriers 
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3.3 Risk Management with Safety Barriers 
3.3.1 Structural Design and Material Selection 
 The material to be used for LNG truck trailers should provide enough strength to 
avoid any leak and stay intact during a crash and should be able to withstand very low 
temperature to avoid brittle fracture. The tanks are generally made of stainless steel or 
aluminum (inner part) and carbon steel (outer part) [4]. Another concern in material 
selection is avoiding corrosion.  
 Several standards have been found for safe structural design of LNG truck 
trailers and if the standards are properly followed risk of a structural failure can be 
greatly reduced. U.S. and Canadian tank construction standards (DOT-4L, ASME 
Section 8 Div 1, NFPA 52 and SAE J2343) are followed for the construction of the 
double walled vacuum insulated tanks [26][28][29][30]. The LNG trailers built in the US 
comply with the Department of Transportation’s design standards DOT CFR49 
specifications– 49 CFR parts 173.318 and 178.338 (MC-338) [27]. The tanks are double 
walled and insulated, robustly designed to avoid any physical or fire damage. [4] 
Specifications of several features that may or may not be installed are provided in the 
DOT standard such as: 
 The temperature of the cryogenic liquid should not be colder than the design 
temperature. [27] 
 The jacket of  the insulation of the tank should be made of steel if a vessel is used 




 The material loaded in the tank should not be able to combine chemically with 
any residue in the packaging. [27] 
 Any valve or fitting made of aluminum outside the jacket that retains lading 
during transportation should not be installed in the tank used to transport 
cryogenic liquid. [27] 
 Any valve or fitting made of aluminum that has the possibility to come in contact 
with oxygen in the cryogenic liquid form should not be installed in the tank 
unless the parts are anodized in accordance with ASTM Standard B 58. [27] 
 The cargo tank should be provided with a manhole if it carries oxygen or any 
other cryogenic liquid. [27] 
3.3.2 Maintenance and Inspection 
Maintenance, inspection and repair of truck trailers are essential for safe 
transportation of LNG. Current safety regulations promulgated by Federal motor carrier 
safety administration (FMCSA) cover all aspects of vehicle operation and maintenance 
requirements in 49 CFR part 396.49 CFR part 396.3 provides detailed instruction for 
inspection, repair and maintenance of all general motor carrier [32]. This standard 
specifies requirements on inspecting frame and frame assemblies, suspension systems, 
axles and attaching parts, wheels and rims and steering systems [32]. It also requires 
recordkeeping of inspections, tests, repairs and maintenance. The standard also provides 
specification on forbidding unsafe operation.  
Although 40 CFR part 393 provides requirements applicable to compressed 




or LNG tanker trucks [33]. Since LNG is a cryogenic liquid, requirement of appropriate 
fuel tank tests should be standardized and applied. Different companies might have 
different procedures but proper regulations are required to enforce maintenance and 
inspection. 
3.3.3 Pressure and Temperature Design  
LNG tanker trucks are equipped with pressure relief devices to prevent 
overpressure. The LNG tanks usually have a design pressure of 100 psig and normally 
operate at less than 70 psig. In case of exceeding the pressure level, the safety release 
valve opens to release the gas safely to the atmosphere. There are also secondary relief 
devices available which are provided with a higher pressure limit. These equipments 
should be properly designed and installed. There are specifications for designing of 
pressure relief systems which are controlled by CGA S-1.2-1980 (pressure relief device 
standards part 2-Cargo and portable tanks for compressed gases). [34] 
 







Tanks must be protected by: 
 A primary system of one or more pressure relief valves. The 
primary pressure relieve system must have a total flow capacity at a 
pressure not exceeding 120 percent of the tank’s design pressure. 
 A secondary system of one of more frangible discs or pressure relief 
valves. The secondary pressure relief system must have a total flow 
capacity at a pressure not exceeding 150 percent of the tank’s design 
pressure. 
Additional  A cargo tank may be equipped with optional pressure control valves 
set at a pressure below tank’s design pressure 
 One or more frangible discs set to function at a pressure not less 






For liquefied compressed gases in un-insulated containers and in insulated 
containers, the minimum required flow capacity of the pressure relief device(s) shall be 
calculated using the formula [34] 
Qa=GuA0.82 
Where 
U = Total thermal conductance of the container insulating material Btu/ (hr.ft2.F) when 
saturated with gaseous lading or air at atmospheric pressure, whichever is greater.  
U=(Thermal conductivity of insulation/Thickness of insulation) 
Qa = Flow capacity in cubic feet per minute of free air 
Gu = Gas factor for un-insulated container 
A = Total outside surface area of the container in square feet 
The standard above can be used for compressed natural gas. For liquefied natural gas 
there are several standards in UK that can be used to design valves for cryogenic 
systems. For designing valves for cryogenic system several considerations should be 
taken into account such as thermal expansion and contraction in cryogenic temperature, 
providing tight shut-off without leakage, deciding whether to fit flanged or welded 
valves, possibility of ‘plugging’ due to ice or hydrate formation and so on[35]. 
Valves selected to be used in LNG service should be checked if it is designed and 
manufactured to relevant standards and codes. Table 8 shows general design features 





Table 8: General design features specific to cryogenic requirements [35] 
 
 
There are also some tests that are specifically required for cryogenic valves:  
 Cryogenic prototype test B S 6364: 1984 [35] 
 Cryogenic production test BS6364:1984 (offers guidance and direction on what 






3.3.4 Certification of Truck Tanks 
According to NFPA-57, Code for Liquefied Natural Gas Vehicular Fuel Tanks & 
Fueling Facilities, 2002 Edition, LNG fuel tanks are required to be designed, fabricated, 
tested and marked in accordance with the requirements of DOT Specification 4 L [25]. 
Also ASME boiler and pressure vessel code- Rules for the Construction of Unfired 
Pressure Vessels is also another code that can be followed [29]. DOT specification 4-L, 
section 173.316 and 173.18 also provides manufacturers the requirements for "cryogenic 
liquids in cylinders" & "cargo cryogenic containers" [36].  There was no specification 
found for the certification testing found for LNG truck trailers. 
3.3.5 Driver Proficiency 
A lot of incidents with LNG truck trailers were caused by improper driving, poor 
judgment, fatigue driving. Drivers should be properly informed about the hazardous 
materials and their driving proficiency should be certified and maintained. For someone 
to obtain a Commercial Driver license with a hazardous materials endorsement (HME), 
he must go through a security threat assessment and obtain clearance from the federal 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) [37]. In some places drivers are required 
to pass a HAZMAT knowledge test. But there are no global HAZMAT driver training 
provided by the authority. HAZMAT employers determine the adequacy of training and 
provide them accordingly. Federal regulation requires a person operating a HAZMAT 
vehicle be trained according to the requirements of 49 CFR parts 390 through 397 [39]. 
These regulations specify requirements related to: 




 Parts and accessories necessary for safe operation  
 Driving of commercial motor vehicles 
 Hours of service of drivers 
 Transportation of hazardous materials; driving and parking rules 
 Inspection, repair and maintenance 
Drivers operating a cargo tank or portable tank with a capacity of 1,000 gallons 
or more must receive training applicable to the requirements and have the appropriate 
State-issued commercial driver's license required by 49 CFR part 383 [38]. If these 
regulations are properly followed and drivers are well trained, incidents can be reduced 
significantly. 
3.3.6 Traffic Rule Enforcement 
To decrease number of incidents, enforcement of some traffic rules are 
important, such as, timing of transportation to avoid busy periods in urban areas. Also 
identification of specific risk areas such as congested areas, proximity to water currents, 
communities, poor conditioned roads, heavy traffic areas, areas with scarce visibility 
should be enforced by the regulatory agencies.  Restrictions on hours of driving, speed 
control, enforcement on using Taco-graphs can make the road transportation of LNG 
much safer. US federal regulation 49 CFR part 395 provides requirement of hours of 
service and break for drivers. According to the rule a specially trained driver who 
operates a commercial motor vehicle specially constructed to service natural gas or oil 
wells that is equipped with a sleeper berth may take 10 consecutive hours of off-duty 




There are rules for drivers in UK regarding driving breaks, driving limits, daily 
and weekly driving limits and so on. The following table summarizes EU rules for 
driving hours. Adoption of these rules their enforcement can reduce the risks in LNG 
road transportation. 
 
Table 9: EU rules for driving hour 
 
 
3.3.7 Active and Passive Fire Protection  
Active fire protection system might not be available instantly in case of a road 
accident but detection and alarm system can be installed for fast communication which 
would work as preventative barrier. Active fire protection systems as mitigative barriers 




 Water curtains to contain/dilute/divert vapor cloud 
 Portable gas drift detection system to ignition source or confined areas where a 
vapor cloud explosion is possible 
 Cooling any nearby property, tanker or equipments 
 Use of high expansion foam for vapor reduction 
 Water monitor to offer limited dilution 
Passive fire protection can help prevent incidents. 
 Flame retardant materials 
 Emergency shutdown system 
NFPA 59A Standard for production, storage & handling of liquefied natural gas is 
used for general plant considerations, process systems, LNG storage containers, 
vaporization facilities, piping systems and components, instrumentation and electrical 
services, transfer of NG and refrigerants, fire Protection, safety and security [24]. There 
is no specific fire protection system for LNG truck trailers but the codes for fire 
protection, safety and security are applicable there. 
3.3.8 Emergency Procedure 
LNG truck trailers are provided with an Emergency Shutdown System which can be 
activated by the driver or automatically if a leak is detected by the system [43]. After 
activated, it closes the main liquid supply valve and stops the transfer pump. The 
vacuum insulated double walled tanks with insulation are designed to stay in place in 




According to an instructional procedure from Swedish Gas Association for 
emergency situation in LNG road transportation, there are different scenarios on which 
the emergency responders have to act on [44]. Instructions on the actions taken during an 
incident are clearly provided there.  
-Evacuate certain area as described in table 10.  
-Stop all engines and remove ignition source, other vehicles containing hazardous cargo 
-Check any damage or leak; take liquid level and pressure readings 
-Calculate gas concentration and emission area and modify evacuation radius 
accordingly 
- Check if the leak can be stopped by shutting of the supply 
-Since gas can be carried away in the direction of wind and find an ignition source, 
authorized personnel should take care of that. 
-According to the condition of the vehicle, determine if it should be driven to a safe 












Table 10: Evacuation radius for different scenarios of LNG tanker truck accident [44] 
Scenario Evacuation radius Additional tasks for the scenario 
The truck has rolled over, 
standing upright, judged to 
be sound 
100 m Determine if the unit can be recovered 
without any special measure 
Leaking gas with no fire 100 m Spray water to the gas cloud  to control 
and dissipate it 
Leaking liquid with no fire 300 m Stop spraying on the leak, if methane 
gas ignites 
Leaking with fire 300 m If the fire cannot be extinguished, allow 
the gas to burn while the tank is cooled 
External fire effecting the 
unit 
300 m Move the transport away from the 
source of fire and if not possible cool 
the vehicles with water 
 
3.3.9 Training and Competence 
The driver of the LNG tanker truck and emergency responders should have 
adequate training to handle any emergency situation. Knowledge on safety data sheet 
and proper awareness of the hazards associated with LNG are required for a driver to be 
competent to drive the truck tanker. As stated earlier, Federal regulation requires a 
person operating a HAZMAT vehicle be trained according to the requirements of 49 




capacity of 1,000 gallons or more must receive training applicable to the requirements 
and have the appropriate State-issued commercial driver's license required by 49 CFR 
part 383 [38].  
In the Texas A&M University, firefighters can be trained in handling LNG fire at 
TEEX Brayton Fire Training Field. There are other training courses for LNG firefighting 
in different companies. 
3.3.10 Un-ignited Gas Cloud Mitigative Control 
 In case of an LNG spill, probability of fire is limited because of its narrow 
flammability range. Vapor cloud can form and until it is dispersed there is chance of fire. 
Adoption of active fire protection systems such as water curtains, portable gas drift 
detection system, high expansion foam and water monitor as mentioned earlier in active 
fire protection system. 
3.3.11 Absence of Confinement and Congestion 
 In the design of LNG truck routes selecting one with less confinement and 
congestion can lower the consequences of an accident. In USA there are route and time 
restrictions for HAZMAT transportation [45]. Also there are restrictions for specific 
routes such as tunnel travel. But there is no specific selection of route for LNG. Since 
LNG vapor has a possibility of moving away with wind and finding a ignition source, 
special restrictions should be regulated to specify LNG transportation routes to avoid 





3.4 Analysis of Scenarios  
In order to have the idea of how much area around a road will be affected by 
LNG fire or vapor dispersion, a consequence analysis has been done using PHAST 
software tool. This software is a comprehensive hazard analysis tool that can be used for 
the analysis of fire, explosion and toxic hazard. From a number of scenarios of LNG 
spill two scenarios have been chosen to determine effects of thermal radiation, 
concentration and overpressure at nearby areas. 
3.4.1 Catastrophic Rupture 
Due to structural failure or terrorist attack, the LNG tanker truck could be 
subjected to a catastrophic failure leading to a large spill or fireball. A consequence 
analysis was carried out to determine area affected by the vapor dispersion and thermal 
radiation from the rupture. Fireballs result from a turbulent fuel or two-phase vapor in air 
[46]. Basic features of static fireball models recommended by both TNO and HSE were 
adopted and implemented in the fireball modeling suite in PHAST [46]. In this study 
TNO model was used. The flame shape and duration are correlated as functions of the 






MFlammable = Mass of fuel involved in the fireball [kg] 
Minput=Total inventory released following vessel rupture [kg] 
fvapour=Mass fraction of vapour released following vessel rupture 
fcorrection=Mass correction factor (CCPS recommended value is 3) 
From the mass of fuel involved in the fireball, surface emissive power is calculated using 
Robert’s correlation which is: 
 
Where, 
Ef=Surface emissive power of the flame [W/m2] 
fs=Fraction of total available heat energy radiated by flame  
∆Hc=Net available heat for radiation [J/kg] 
fs is expressed in terms of the fuel’s saturated-vapour/vessel-burst pressure, Psat at the 





Net available heat for radiation ∆Hc defined according to the HSE model is: 
 
According to TNO model, ∆Hc is defined as [46]: 
 
Where, 
∆Hcomb= Heat of combustion of the fuel [J/kg] 
∆Hvap= Latent heat of vaporization of the fuel at its boiling point [J/kg] 
Cp,Liq=  Specific heat capacity of the fluid at constant pressure [J/kg/K] 
For simplicity in the simulation composition of LNG was assumed to be 100% 
Methane. To obtain results for a worst case scenario Pasquill stability class was assumed 
to be F with a wind speed of 1.5 m/s. An LNG tank with 13000 US gallon of LNG was 
considered in this case. Figure 15 shows LNG concentration over time at a given 
distance after the rupture. It is observed that the concentration reaches upper 
flammability limit at around 50s and lower flammability limit at around 90s. Figure 16 






Figure 15: Concentration of LNG vs. time at a given distance 
 
 





Table 11 shows distances to different level of concentration of LNG after a catastrophic 
rupture. According to the instructional procedure of Swedish Gas Association, minimum 
evacuation distance in case of a LNG fire should be 300m [44]. From the results, it is 
observed that distances to a vapor concentration of Upper and lower flammability falls 
within the distance. Distance to vapor concentration of half the lower flammability limit 
is 334.662 m which is more than the required evacuation distance of 300 m. According 
to NFPA 59A 50% of lower flammability limit of LNG should not cross the property 
line [24]. If this regulation is considered for a road accident, distance to 0.5 LFL is out of 
the evacuation area. 
 
Table 11: Distances to different level of concentration 
Concentration (ppm) Distance (m) Area covered (m2) 
UFL (165000) 134.518 30475 
LFL (44000) 280.754 160231 
0.5 LFL(22000) 334.662 240543 
 
In an event of a catastrophic rupture of an LNG tanker truck, LNG spill can 
result to a fireball if any ignition source is found. Figure 17 shows thermal radiation 





Figure 17: Thermal radiation from the fireball vs. distance 
 
NFPA 59A standard specifies distances to a thermal radiation of 5KW/m2 as a 
safe level of exposure [24]. Also in regulations of several other countries, this value has 
been selected as the threshold level for thermal exposure. In this heat flux a person 
would suffer 2nd degree skin burns on at least 10 % of their bodies within 30 seconds of 
exposure to the fire [24]. From a simulation of catastrophic rupture of an LNG truck, 
distances to different levels of radiation was found and provided in Table 12. The safe 





Table 12: Distances to different thermal radiation levels 




37.5 Not reached 
 
In an event of LNG spill due to rupture of a tank, a delayed ignition can damage 
more since LNG gets more time to reach to the flammable concentration. Figure 18 and 
19 shows overpressure vs. distance trend due to a late explosion and an early explosion. 
It is observed from the figures that in case of an early explosion, maximum overpressure 
is about 14.5 psi up to a distance of 40 m from the source of ignition and in case of a late 
ignition maximum overpressure reached approximately 370 m from the source. 
According to table 5 maximum evacuation distance provided by emergency responders 
is 300 m which is less than the distance with maximum overpressure was found. In case 
of an early ignition, overpressure at 300 m is approximately 0.5 psi which can cause 
minor structural damage like large and small windows shatter or occasional damage to 
window frames [47]. In case of a delayed ignition, there are more catastrophic 
consequences. Overpressure at 300 m in case of a delayed ignition was found to be 14.5 




damage to surroundings [47]. The estimation of these types of consequences requires 
more accurate data to get correct result. 
 
 





Figure 19: Early explosion overpressure vs. distance 
 
3.4.2 LNG Pool Fire 
After a release of LNG tank, a pool might form if there is sufficient discharge 
time. Figure 20 and figure 21 shows a radiation vs. distance for late pool fire and an 
early pool fire respectively. It was observed that maximum radiation level was 205 
KW/m2 for an early fire around a distance of 8m downwind. In case of a delayed ignition 





Figure 20: Radiation vs. distance for late pool fire 
 
 




Also figure 22 shows centerline concentration of LNG with respect to distance 
downwind which does not show any significant hazard for the nearby area. Also figure 









Figure 23: Flash fire envelope 
 
Table 13 shows a comparison of distances to different level of concentrations of 
LNG for two different scenarios-catastrophic rupture and pool vaporization. It has been 
observed that the flammable region stays within 300 m which is the evacuation distance 








Table 13: Comparison of distances to different level of concentrations 
Scenario UFL distance (m) LFL distance (m) 0.5LFL distance (m) 
Catastrophic rupture 134.518 280.754 334.662 
Pool vaporization 53.56 110.88 278.174 
 
Also table 14 shows a comparison of distances to different level of thermal 
radiation for three different scenarios-catastrophic rupture, early pool fire and late pool 
fire. According to NFPA 59A, distance to a thermal radiation of 5KW/m2 is considered 
as a safe level of exposure [24]. From the table it is observed that none of the distances 
exceeds the standard evacuation distance of 300 m. 
 
Table 14: Comparison of distances to different level of thermal radiation 





37.5 Not reached 














The purpose of the analysis of these scenarios is to find out the requirement of 
evacuation planning around a road where an LNG tanker truck might get into an 
accident. To avoid any unwanted incident, residential planning should be done avoiding 
exposure zone of a release of LNG from a tanker truck in highways. The associated 
companies should plan their route avoiding highly residential areas. Route planning 
should also be done avoiding congested and confined area such as downtown, tunnel 

















4.1 Risk Management Strategy 
 Risks of an LNG spill from an accident of tanker truck can be reduced through a 
number of approaches such as reducing the potential and consequences of a spill, 
undertaking steps to ensure safety of the tanker truck, roadways, people and property. To 
ensure implementation of these approaches, a risk management strategy should be set 
which can be combination of prevention and mitigation techniques. 
 In this study, for risk management, a set of preventative and mitigative safety 
barriers were discussed to reduce the potential for and the hazards of an accidental or 
intentional spill. These strategies should be applied effectively, efficiently and 
economically to improve safety and security of LNG road transportation.  
 Preventative safety barriers that can function continuously include structural 
design, material selection, pressure and temperature design, passive fire protection. In 
US there are standard design requirements for structural design of LNG tanker truck 
provided by Department of transportation and some others. The standard is designed for 
vehicles carrying all cryogenic liquids and it works fine for LNG. Following the 
standards accurately will reduce the risk of any kind of accidental breach. For the design 
of pressure relief systems in the tanker truck standard federal regulations are followed. 
Properly following these standards can greatly reduce the chances of a cracked or failed 




 Maintenance and inspection of a LNG tanker truck before its operation is an 
essential step for safe transportation. There are general maintenance and inspection 
standards available from Federal motor carrier safety administration (FMCSA) and 
federal regulations. But there is nothing specified for LNG tanker truck. Although the 
regulations work fine, more specified standards can reduce the risks of any future 
accident.  
 There is no specific certification testing found for LNG truck tanks. Although 
DOT specification 4-L is followed for the requirements of cryogenic liquids containers, 
studies should be carried out to observe any difference in tank trucks carrying LNG and 
other cryogenic liquids. 
 A significant number of road accident associated with LNG tanker trucks are 
caused by lack of driver proficiency. Even if the drivers have passed all necessary tests 
to get HAZMAT driver license, they are required to be trained according to federal 
regulations and also should have knowledge on the hazards and emergency response 
requirements for LNG. 
 Traffic rule enforcement is another important safety barrier to prevent incidents. 
Regulatory agencies should enforce on adopting rules on avoiding risk areas, confined 
areas, residential areas, heavy traffic areas and restrict hours of driving, speed control. 
Enforcement of using taco-graphs can help monitoring driving activities. 
 For prevention and mitigation of fire from an LNG spill, specified active and 
passive fire protection systems are used. For the fire protection activity, emergency 




promptly. In this study a consequence analysis was carried on to determine if the 
evacuation distance specified by emergency responders is good enough. From two 
scenarios-catastrophic rupture and LNG pool fire, it was seen that the amount of thermal 
radiation and overpressure are not dangerous in an evacuation distance of 300 m [39]. 
 As we know LNG has a narrow flammability range (5%-15% concentration). So 
the possibility of a fire from LNG spill is very low unless there is any congestion or 
confinement. In a confined space LNG vapor gets time to reach to a flammable 
concentration and ignites in the presence of an ignition source. Therefore, some systems 
should be adopted to control and reduce the vapor cloud. Also route selection avoiding 
congested areas like residential areas, downtown or tunnels can help reduce the risks.  
4.2 Conclusion  
 This study compiles almost all the relevant information on requirement of safe 
transportation of LNG tanker trucks. From the historical analysis, it has been observed 
that most of the incidents related to LNG road transportation were near miss incidents 
with insignificant spill or no spill of LNG. These near miss incidents should be 
accounted for and should be used as leading indicators to prevent further incidents. That 
is why a set of safety barriers were suggested to be considered for improvement. 
 This study provides an overview of the problem related to safety and security of 
LNG road transportation. But there should be more works carried out for more accurate 
measurement of consequences so that prevention and mitigations measures can be 





4.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
 LNG spill dispersion and fire modeling on land can be done for more 
accurate consequence estimation. For different type of location this 
analysis could be done to observe any significant difference. 
 The bow-tie analysis can be extended by defining and weighing 
escalation factors to the safety barriers. Escalation factors are conditions 
that lead to increased risk. 
 Consequence analysis of LNG spill can be carried out for different 
composition and to observe any significant difference.  
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LNG Road Transportation Incidents (1971-2011) [16][17] 
Date  Location  Description 
1971 Waterbury VT Blowout, 20 percent spill, no fire 
1971 Warner NH Driver fatigue, rollover cracked fitting, gas leak, no fire 
1971 N. Whitehall, WI Head on collision, gasoline and tire fire 
1973 Raynham, MA Trailer overturned , no fire 
1973 New Jersey rollover, damage to trailer, no fire 
1974 New Jersey faulty break , check valve cracked, no fire 
1974 McKee City Loose valve leaked 
1975 Dalton, GA rollover, no fire 
1976 Chattanooga, TN rollover, no fire 
1976 Pawtucket, RI car hit trailer, no fire 
1977 Connecticut truck hit by tow truck 
1977 Waterbury, CT hit by trailer, no loss of cargo 
1977 Los Angeles CA rollover, no fire 
1981 Barnegat, NJ excessive speed during turn, loss of product 
1981 Lexington, MA rollover, no fire, no product loss 




1992 Unknown A relay in the air conditioning system ignited a 
flammable methane-air mixture  
1993 Everett, MA trailer slide off the wheel, no fire 
1994 Revere, MA Trailer overturn at high speed 
1997* Canal Winchester, OH Overpressure relief valve failed 
1998* Woburn, MA Trailer travelling at high speed, no loss 
1999* Brighton, IL Vehicular crash 
2001* Phoenix, AZ Vehicular crash in high speed 
2002* Chattanooga, TN Loose Closure  Component  or Device 
2002 Catalonia, Spain Trailer overturn and fire 
2003 Newberry Springs, CA Driver Fatigue, vehicle crash 
2003 Woburn, MA Trailer overturned , no leakage 
2005 Reno, NV LNG leak from fire-block valve 
2006* Everett, MA Rollover accident 
2007 Plymouth, IN Vehicular crash, LNG leak 
2007 Candiz, Spain Slid down a bank, small fire caused by truck fuel 
2010* Tuba City, AZ Drunk Driving 
2011* Long beach, CA Defective component or device 
2011 Istanbul, Turkey Truck got stuck under a overpass 
2012* Ashville, AL Human error 
*PHMSA (Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration)  
 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
 
